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A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE SO-CALLED LOCKER ROOM
MENTALITY AS A MEANS TO RATIONALIZE THE
DRUG TESTING OF STUDENT ATHLETES
WALTER

I.

T.

CHAMPION, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,' the United States
Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals and held that high school student athletes can be subject
to random suspicionless drug tests. The Court reached this decision on the grounds that these students labor under a lessened expectation of privacy due to the "locker room mentality" and the
bromide that athletes are role models and as such must be held to a
higher standard than must other students. 2 Justice Scalia's majority
opinion perpetuated the old rubric that the so-called "locker room
mentality" lessens an athlete's expectation of privacy. 3 The majority reasoned that urinating as part of a drug test is merely an extension or variation of public showering, which is a component of a
typical locker room environment. 4 This locker room environment,
Justice Scalia reasoned, offers a low expectation of privacy. It appears that Justice Scalia's assertions, however, are both incorrect
and outdated. This is especially true in light of evidence that students now avoid public showers because of such factors as height* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Law Library, at Texas Southern University Law School; B.A., St. Joseph's University; M.A., Western Illinois University; M.S., Drexel University; J.D., Temple University. He is also the author of
the recent treatise, FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW.
1. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995), rev' 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994).
2. See id. at 2392-93. The district court found that an increase in drug and
alcohol abuse at Vemonia School District had been "largely fueled by the 'role
model' effect of athletes' drug use." Id. at 2395-96. The Supreme Court noted
that "[a]s elsewhere in small-town America, school sports play a prominent role in
the town's life, and student athletes are admired in their schools and in the community." Id. at 2388.
3. See id. at 2392-93.
4. Id. The Supreme Court asserted that there is a low degree of privacy in a
traditional locker room environment. See id. The Court stated: "[s]chool sports
are not for the bashful. They require 'suiting up' before each practice or event,
and showering and changing afterwards. Public school locker rooms, the usual
sites for these activities, are not notable for the privacy they afford." Id. at 2392.
The Court went on to describe the Vernonia School District locker rooms as within
this typical mold, having communal showers and no individual dressing rooms. See
id. at 2393.

(283)
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ened modesty, distorted self images, and a tradition of privacy at
5
home.
Justice Scalia's platitudes did not escape detection. Joined by
Justices Souter and Stevens, Justice O'Connor launched a rousing
attack on the majority's "business as usual" approach to the legitimacy of the drug testing of student-athletes. 6 The Acton majority's
rationale can be summarized as follows: "An athlete's expectation
of privacy is diminished by a pattern of testing that ordinarily accompanies athletic involvement (preseason physical), by the mechanisms of the test itself (urinating in a closed stall with the
'monitor' outside listening for the appropriate sounds) and the
general condition of athletic involvement (for lack of a better term,
the locker room mentality)." 7 This note analyzes the rationale of
the locker room mentality perpetuated in Vernonia School District 47J
v. Acton. Before analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in Acton,
however, it is helpful to understand the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp.,8 which
the Acton Court cited as support for its locker room mentality
rationale.
II.

THE SHADOW OF THE

Schaill DECISION

Before Acton, the standard for the drug testing of high school
athletes was established by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp.9 In Schaill, as in Acton, the
school's program was predicated on the consent of the individual
athlete. In both cases, the plaintiff-athlete refused to sign a consent
5. See DirkJohnson, Students Still Sweat, They Just Don't Shower, N.Y. TIMES, April
22, 1996, at Al. "In a striking measure of changed sensibilities in school and society, showering after physical education class, once an almost military ritual, has
become virtually extinct. And the reasons seem as varied as insecurities about
body image, heightened sexual awareness and a lack of time in a busy school
schedule." Id.
6. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397-2407.
7. Walter T. Champion, Jr., The NCAA 's Drug Testing Policies: Walking a Constitutional Tightrope, 67 N.D. L. REv. 269, 270 (1991) (hereinafter Champion, NCAA).
See also Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988)
(upholding random suspicionless drug testing in high school athletics). See generally Recent Case, Search and Seizure - Suspicionless Drug Testing - Seventh Circuit Upholds Drug Testing of Student Athletes in the Public Schools. Schaill v. Tippecanoe
County School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988), 103 HARv. L. REV. 591 (1989);
Mary L. Scott, Comment, Is Innocence Forever Gone? Drug Testing High School Athletes
Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 54 Mo. L. REv. 425 (1989); Kathleen
M. Dorr, Annotation, Validity, UnderFederal Constitution, of Regulations, Rules, or Statutes Allowing Drug Testing of Students, 87 A.L.R. FED. 148 (1988).
8. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
9. Id. at 1309.
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form granting the school the authority to conduct mandatory
urinalysis. In Schaill, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether the suspicionless random drug testing
of student athletes was constitutional. The answer seems to be that
student athletes lose some of their constitutional rights in high
school, and provided the testing procedures are not egregiously bizarre, the courts will allow urinalysis with consent.' 0
As a threshold matter, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
had to determine whether or not there was a Fourth Amendment
search." "[A] 'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to consider is infringed."'12 The key question in
drug testing, therefore, is whether an athlete has a right to privacy
with regards to urinalysis. Schaill sets the tone for a discussion of
the parameters of the right to privacy in the student-athlete
context.
The Schaill court concluded that there was a high expectation
of privacy with regards to urination, therefore, urinalysis did qualify
as a Fourth Amendment search. 1 3 The court noted that urine is a
very private thing.' 4 "The fact that urine is voluntarily discharged
from the body and treated as a waste product does not eliminate
the expectation of privacy which an individual possesses in his or
her urine.'

5

Even though urine is excreted from the body, it is not

knowingly exposed to the public; instead the manner in which an
6
individual disposes of his or her urine is a highly private matter.'
This demonstrates that urine is not intended to be inspected or
17
examined by anyone.
Having determined that the Tippecanoe random drug testing
program was a Fourth Amendment search, the court next had to
10. See generally WALTER T.

CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW

§ 21.5,

at 385 (1990) (hereinafter CHAMPION).

11. See Schaill 864 F.2d at 1311.
12. Id. at 1311-12 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
(1984)).
13. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir.
1988).
14. Id. at 1318. "In general, there is a substantial expectation of privacy in
connection with the act of urination." Id.
15. Id. at 1312.
16. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
17. See id. The court also concluded that the voluntariness of students' submission to urinalysis did not effect the drug testing's status as a search. See id. at

1312-13. Although students were not tested without previously giving their consent, the fact that students were forced to waive their Fourth Amendment rights in
order to play sports, qualified the drug testing as a search. See id.
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determine whether or not the search was reasonable. 18 Since the
drug testing was a suspicionless search (a search without any evidence of unlawful activity) the Tippecanoe County School Corporation faced a heavy burden of justifying the reasonableness of its
program. 19 The court listed the factors relevant to determining the
constitutionality of suspicionless random drug testing.2 0 First, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that an "individual's privacy
rights vary with the context - whether the individual is at home, at
work, in school or in jail, in a car or on a public sidewalk."2 1 Not
only can the physical circumstances affect an individual's reasonable expectations of privacy but, over time, an individual's expectations of privacy in a certain activity can be diminished by a past
history of significant governmental regulation. 2 2 Second, in order
for a governmental regulation to validly diminish one's privacy
rights, the interest furthered by the particular privacy invasion it
authorizes, "must be weighty, and generally of a nature that alternate, less intrusive means of detection would not sufficiently serve
the government's ends." 2 3 In the drug testing of student-athletes

realm, the government's search should be evaluated to determine
whether the interest it furthers is weighty and whether there are
alternative, less intrusive means of drug use detection that could be
employed to meet the school's ends. 24 Furthermore, if alternative
investigative techniques would not be as effective in deterring the
unlawful conduct as the challenged practice, this factor may be
25
considered.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied the reasonableness factors to the facts in Schaill. The court first examined the con18. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1313-14. The standard used for school searches is "reasonableness [ ] under all the circumstances." Id. at 1314 (quoting New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (alteration in original)). The rationale for this
reasonableness standard, as opposed to a search warrant or probable cause requirement, is that school teachers and administrators can not be expected to
school themselves in the subtleties of the probable cause standard. See id.
19. See id. at 1315-16. Despite this heavy burden for suspicionless searches,
there are several situations in which such searches are permitted. See id. The
Schaill court listed several of these situations, including fixed checkpoints for automobile travelers. Id. at 1316.
20. See id. at 1317-18.
21. Id. at 1317.
22. See id.
23. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318.
24. See id.
25. See CHAMPION, supranote 10, § 21:4, at 383. The court also pointed to two
other factors that determine the reasonableness of a suspicionless search: (1) the
extent to which the examining officer's discretion is limited, and (2) whether the
search is intended to discover criminal activity. See Schail4 864 F.2d at 1318.
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text of the search. In Schaill, the athlete entered a closed lavatory
stall and the monitor stood outside listening for appropriate
sounds. 26 The invasion of privacy in Schaill was less severe, therefore, than the invasion would have been if the monitor actually observed the act of urination. 2 7 The Schaill court, like the Acton court,
also found great significance in the fact that the drug testing program was implemented solely with participants in an interscholastic
athletic program. 28 The argument again is that student athletes
possess a diminished expectation of privacy and, in particular, privacy with respect to urinating and urinalysis. This argument is
based on the element of communal undress inherent in athletic
29
participation, which suggests a reduced expectation of privacy.

The Schaill court also pointed to the past history of government regulation in public schools and specifically within athletic
programs. The Schaill court noted that physical examinations are
integral to almost all athletic programs.3 0 In fact, the athletes and
cheerleaders in Schaill had long been required to produce a urine
sample as part of a mandatory medical examination.3 1 Although
these medical test samples were not produced under monitored circumstances, were only tested for the presence of sugar and were
given to the athlete's physician of choice rather than to a school
official, the fact remained that samples were required, suggesting
that legitimate expectations of privacy in the student athlete were
diminished. 3 2 In other words, urine samples were already no big
deal. The Schaill court held that it was implausible that competitive
athletes could have general expectations of privacy with respect to
33
urine tests.
In Schaill, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
urinalysis was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment
based on the school's interest in maintaining a drug-free athletic
program. 34 Factors the court considered in reaching this decision
include the fact that the athlete's consent was a prerequisite to drug
testing and that other athletes could be harmed in a drug-infested
26. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318. The monitor was also supposed to check the
temperature of the urine sample to assure its genuineness. See id. at 1311.
27. Id. at 1318.
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. Schail, 864 F.2d at 1318.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 1324.
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sports program.3 5 Additionally, the court noted that a person loses
some constitutional rights while in a public high school. 3 6 The
question left for the Supreme Court was whether the warrantless,
suspicionless search allowed in Schaill was consistent with the
37
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness.
A.

The Supreme Court Follows Schaill

As in Schaill, the Acton plaintiffs challenged the constitutional38
ity of suspicionless random drug testing of high school athletes.
In Acton, at the circuit court level, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals veered from Schaill, and it looked like some semblance of privacy would return to our beleaguered athletes. 39 The Supreme
Court, however, dropped a bomb by vacating and remanding Acton
on June 26, 1995.40 The Supreme Court chose the route (and the
rationale) articulated by the Seventh Circuit in Schaill (and to some
extent, the California Supreme Court in Hill v. NCAA 41 ) as opposed
to the one suggested by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Acton.
Schaill provided the basic legal structure for the Supreme
Court's opinion in Acton. Accordingly, as of June 26, 1995, suspicionless (no probable cause), random drug testing of high school
35. See CHAMPION, supra note 10, § 21.5, at 385.
36. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1324.
37. See CHAMPION, supra note 10, § 21.5, at 385.
38. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2388. In Acton, Vernonia School District 47J, after
increased drug problems within its public schools, enacted a policy requiring student athletes to consent to random suspicionless drug testing. Id. at 2388-89.
James Acton, at the time a seventh-grader, refused to sign the required consent
form. See id. at 2390. The Actons, alleging that the suspicionless random drug
testing violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, filed suit in the District
Court for the District of Oregon. See id.
39. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1527 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd,
115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). The Ninth Circuit averred that the Seventh Circuit "unduly minimized the privacy interests of students." Id. "[W]e simply do not agree
with the Seventh Circuit." Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Seventh Circuit
balanced the privacy interests of the student against the substantial interests of the
school. See id. n.3. The Ninth Circuit believed, in contrast, that the government
interest would have to be compelling and would have to outweigh the privacy interest of the student before such a policy could be constitutional. Id. at 1526.
40. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397. "The Ninth Circuit held that Vernonia's Policy
not only violated the Fourth Amendment, but also, by reason of that violation,
contravened Article I, § 9 of the Oregon Constitution." Id. Because the Court
concluded that the former holding was in error, "the latter holding rested on a
flawed premise." Id. The Court thus remanded the Ninth Circuit decision with
respect to the Oregon Constitution. Id.
41. 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994) (intercollegiate athletic association's drug testing policy which involved monitoring of urination and testing of urine samples did
not violate California's constitutional ight to privacy).
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student-athletes is deemed to be constitutional. 4 2 The decision was
reached by a 6-3 majority, written by Justice Scalia, with the aforementioned rousing dissent by Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices
Stevens and Souter. Justice O'Connor was livid: noting that "[b]y
the reasoning of today's decision, the millions of these students
who participate in interscholastic sports, an overwhelming majority
of whom have given school officials no reason whatsoever to suspect
43
they use drugs at school, are open to an intrusive bodily search.
In short, the Court held that the tests utilized in the Vernonia
School District did not violate the student's constitutional right to
be free from unreasonable searches. 4 4 This is partially because
James Acton, as a result of "the locker room mentality," possessed a
lessened expectation of privacy. 45 The Court noted that school
sports, which require a level of communal undress, are not for the
bashful.4 6 In addition, the Court stated that student athletes were
subject to increased regulations such as physical examinations, insurance coverage requirements and minimum grade point averages. 47 This mentality suggests that in choosing to go out for the
team, Acton voluntarily subjected himself to a degree of regulation
greater than that which was imposed upon the general student
body. 48 As the school district had an immediate, legitimate concern (the "role model" argument) in preventing drug abuse, and as
the privacy invasion was negligible because the expectation of privacy was already diminished, the Court concluded that the school
district's program was reasonable and it should not be compelled to
49
develop the "least intrusive" search.
42. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 2396. "Taking into account all the factors we have considered
above the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the
search, and the severity of the need met by the search we conclude that Vernonia's
Policy is reasonable and hence constitutional." Id.
45. See id. at 2393.
46. See id. The locker rooms in the Vernonia School District were typical: "no
individual dressing rooms are provided; shower heads are lined up along the wall,
unseparated by any sort of partition or curtain; not even all the toilet stalls have
doors." Id.
47. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393. The Court compared student athletes to adults
in closely regulated industries. See id. "Somewhat like adults who choose to participate in a 'closely regulated industry,' students who voluntarily participate in school
athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy." Id. (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 627 (1989)).
48. See id. This rationale can probably most readily be described as an "it
comes with the territory" approach.
49. See id. at 2395-96.
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The majority opinion generated a fire storm of popular interest. 50 Justice O'Connor's dissent most eloquently expressed the

problems inherent in the Acton majority:
It cannot be too often stated that the greatest threats to
our constitutional freedoms come in times of crisis. But
we must also stay mindful that not all government responses to such times are hysterical overreactions; some
crises are quite real, and when they are, they serve precisely as the compelling state interest that we have said
may justify a measured intrusion on constitutional rights.
The only way for judges to mediate these conflicting impulses is to do what they do anyway: stay close to the record in each case that appears before them, and make their
50. See CHAMPION, supra note 10, § 21.7 (Supp. 1996); Linda Greenhouse,
High Court Upholds Drug Tests For Some Public School Athletes, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
1995, at Al; Tamar Lewin, Despite Ruling, Wide Drug Testing of Students is not Foreseen, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1995, at B7; Marcia Chambers, Courts Put Safety First in
Drug Tests, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1995, at 35. See also Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J,
23 F.3d 1514, 1527 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). The Ninth Circuit concluded that:

We understand the importance of having drug-free children, and the
sorrow our society is reaping from the fact that the drugs which have
invaded it have found their way into our children's hands. We also understand the deep concerns of parents, teachers, administrators, and
school boards. We have no doubt that the District and those associated
with it have proceeded in all good faith.
However, we also understand the concern of our forebears and the
importance of the protections given by the constitutional provisions
which prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. We are all too aware
of the dangers to our liberties that those provisions are designed to protect against and of the constant pressures upon them, despite centuries of
living with and under their protections.
We have found that we must live with a certain amount of discomfort, even danger, if we are to maintain constitutional protections. If they
are to continue to exist and flourish, we and our children must understand them, profit from them, and believe in them. They are, after all,
just words, ideas, beliefs, and principles. But if we are vigilant there is a
great deal of power in the word "just."
Given the Fourth Amendment, given our traditions, given our law,
we are constrained to hold that the Policy is invalid under the Fourth
Amendment. That being so, Oregon would find it invalid under Article I,
Section 9, of its Constitution.
Id. On remand, the majority of the Ninth Circuit panel averred that the Oregon
Supreme Court would not offer any greater protection under the provisions of the
Oregon Constitution. See Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 66 F.3d 217, 218 (9th
Cir. 1995). Therefore, the panel decided to affirm the judgment of the district
court. See id. There was, however, a vigorous dissent (Reinhardt, J.) which preferred to certify the question to the Oregon Supreme Court. See id. at 219-20.
Judge Reinhardt disagreed strongly with the majority's bold statement that the Oregon Constitution would afford no greater protection than Justice Scalia's Acton
majority. See id. at 218-20.
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judgments based on that alone. Having reviewed the record here, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the District's
suspicionless policy of testing all student-athletes sweeps
too broadly, and too imprecisely, to be reasonable under
51
the Fourth Amendment.
Notwithstanding, the majority ignored the logic of Justice
O'Connor and continued with a return to a family value approach.
Justice Scalia first raised the old standard that athletes are special and different because they are role models. "As elsewhere in
small-town America, school sports play a prominent role in the
town's life, and student athletes are admired in their schools and in
the community." 52 The Court concluded that the "role-model" effect of athletes' drug use fueled the serious drug use problem
within the Vernonia School District.53 Justice Scalia then mulls another bromide, that "drug use increases the risk of sports-related
injury.'54
51. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2407. See also Moule v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 69, 863 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Ariz. 1994), rev'd, 66 F.3d 335 (9th Cir. 1997).
The Moule case, although interesting, contains little real significance after the
Supreme Court's decision in Acton. Moule was decided on September 9, 1994, and

religiously adhered to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals version of Acton, which
was decided on May 5, 1994. Of course, the Supreme Court's rendition of Acton,
which vacated and remanded the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
was decided on June 26, 1995. In Moule, a case also involving a random drug testing program for student-athletes, the District Court for the District of Arizona followed the Ninth Circuit in Acton and found that the school district's drug testing
policy violated the Fourth Amendment. Moule, 863 F. Supp. at 1103. Interestingly,
the court also opined that the consent forms signed by both father and son under
the district's "no testing, no playing" requirement, were not truly voluntary. Id.
The Moules were coerced, for constitutional purposes, by the fact that young
Moule would have been barred from participation without the signed consent
form. See also Derdeyn v. University of Colo., 832 P.2d 1031, 1035 (Colo. Ct. App.
1991), aff'd, 863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993) (holding athlete's consent not voluntary).
52. Acton, 115 S.Ct. at 2388.
53. See id. at 2395-96. "It seems to us self-evident that a drug problem largely
fueled by the 'role-model' effect of athletes' drug use ... is effectively addressed by
making sure that athletes do not use drugs." Id. The Vernonia School District first
expressed its concern for the "role-model" effect in the district court. See Acton v.
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992), rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514
(9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (1995). The district court concluded that
"the school's leading athletes might have a significant poisoning impact, upon the
broader student population, including the young and more impressionable elementary school students who would eventually seek to emulate their elders." Id.
54. Acton, 115 S.Ct. at 2389. The Court pointed to testimony in the district
court confirming the "delirious effects of drugs on motivation, memory, judgement, reaction, coordination, and performance." Id. But see Derdeyn v. University
of Colo., 863 P.2d 929, 933 (Colo. 1993) (holding drug use did not increase risk of
sports-related injuries).
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A non-probable cause search can be constitutional if there are
special needs that make the requirement of probable cause impractical.5 5 One wonders what special needs are present in Acton where
the quarry is ajunior high school would be athlete that resides with
his parents. Usually, the special needs is the risk of danger: e.g., a
fleeing felon, a sweating stick of dynamite, etc. Acton opens the
door for millions of school children to be subjected to intrusive
bodily searches without even a scintilla of probable cause. "Princi56
ples of law once bent, do not snap back easily."
Again, one wonders why more rational minds could not have
prevailed. Why not a less broad-based approach that would decline
to sweep innocent junior high school students into a drag net? For
example, a test based on the probable cause of observed rapid eye
movement. Why not choose a less intrusive available alternative
which would also serve the stated purpose of monitoring and curtailing illegal drug use by students? "Options such as education or
impairment testing would be as effective as drug testing and not
nearly as intrusive. Effective education which would teach athletes
to handle stress and explain the underlying reasons for drug abuse"
is certainly more appropriate than blanket testing which merely
teaches the athlete to "say no" to drug usage when there's the possi-

57
bility of being apprehended.
The process in Acton is overly broad and unnecessarily intrusive. A better approach was demonstrated in the California Court
of Appeals in Hill v. NCAA, 5 8 which also dealt with random, suspicionless urinalysis used at whim by a governing body, in this case
the NCAA. Much was made in the Appeals Court version of Hill
about the overly intrusive quality of the NCAA drug testing policy
and the fact that forced urination on command was extremely em-

55. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873
(1987)). In Griffin, the Court held that a search sans probable cause can be constitutional if "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make
the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." Griffin, 483 U.S. at
873 (quoting NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)). In T.L.O., there was
no probable cause but there was an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, unlike
the situation here. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 345-47.
56. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 655 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Champion, NCAA, supra note 7, at 278-79. See also Hill v. NCAA, 273 Cal.
Rptr. 402, 421 (1990), rev'd, 865 P.2d 633 (1994). The California Court of Appeals
in Hill averred that drug education is "certainly a viable alternative to drug testing"
which had not been adequately attempted by the NCAA. Id. Drug testing could
not continue while less intrusive alternatives had not yet been adequately attempted. See id. at 422.
58. 273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1990), rev'd, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
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barrassing and humiliating. 5 9 The California Court of Appeals in
Hill also mentioned that there were less intrusive methods available,
60
namely, education and testing based on a reasonable suspicion.
The Hill testing program, like Acton, tested the pattern of drug use
that occurred sometime before the big game, as opposed to the
impairment of the athlete directly prior to the event. 6 1 If the goal is
to reduce the possibility of injury due to impairment (and both the
California Supreme Court version of Hill and the United States
Supreme Court rendition of Acton claim that it is), then one must
assume that the fairest type of test would be one that tests the athlete's impairment at the time of the game based on a reasonable
62
suspicion of drug use.
The urine testing policies used by both the NCAA in Hill and
the Vernonia School District in Acton are inherently intrusive and
inconclusive. 63 Both pose "the spectre of Big Brother peering over
your shoulder (literally) ."64 Another option might be vocal impairment testing which tests the level of impairment at a specific moment in time based on an analysis of the subject's voicing
patterns. 65 Vocal impairment testing, or some other test that evaluates the current level of impairment and is based on reasonable
suspicion, makes much more sense than the expensive, overly intrusive, embarrassing hit-or-miss witch hunts perpetrated by the NCAA
66
and the Vernonia School District.
B.

Justice Scalia's Nostalgic Journey

Justice Scalia begins his discussion with the truism that the nature of the State's power over schoolchildren is custodial and tutelary which permits a degree of supervision and control that would
59. See id. at 406. See also Champion, NCAA, supra note 7, at 279.
60. Hill, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 421. The California Court of Appeals also noted
that drug education might be more effective at destroying drug myths and deterring general drug use than would be testing for certain specified drugs. See id. at
422.
61. Id. at 414. See also Champion, NCAA, supra note 7, at 279.
62. See Champion, NCAA, supra note 7, at 279-80.
63. See id. at 280. See also David J. Greenblatt, M.D., Urine Drug Testing: What
Does It Test?, 23 NEw ENG. L. REV. 651 (1988-89).
64. Champion, NCAA, supra note 7, at 280.
65. See id. (citing Hayre, Speaking on Drugs, 32 Security Management 98 (Apr.
1988)). Dr. Hayre's program monitors on-thejob fitness by having the subject
speak into an ordinary telephone; the voice pattern is then analyzed via computer
and a current impairment measure is reported within seconds. See id.
66. See Champion, NCAA, supra note 7, at 280.
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be unacceptable with free adults. 6 7 But, before the custodial and
tutelary power kicks in, there must first be a problem, 68 which was
not the case in Acton. Although the expectations are lesser for public schoolchildren, the intrusion must still be reasonable. Various
physical examinations and vaccinations are probably reasonable,
however, these examinations certainly do not include public urination. Also, these tests (vision, hearing and scoliosis) do not carry
with them an approbation factor, as does the Acton drug testing
(e.g., wearing glasses is not as onerous as being labeled, perhaps
erroneously, as a "druggie"). Nor are the run-of-the-mill tests as intrusive as the random, suspicionless drug testing of minor, studentathletes.
The Acton majority continues: "Legitimate privacy expectations
are even less with regard to student athletes. School sports are not
for the bashful. They require 'suiting up' before each practice or
event, and showering and changing afterwards." 69 "Public school
locker rooms, the usual sites for these activities, are not notable for
the privacy they afford. The locker rooms in Vernonia are typical:
no individual dressing rooms are provided; shower heads are lined
up along a wall, unseparated by any sort of partition or curtain; not
even all the toilet stalls have doors. '70 The Scalia majority noted
the Schaill maxim that there is "an element of 'communal undress'
inherent in athletic participation."' 71 But, there is a world of difference between the modicum of communal undress that the Schaill
court erroneously believed is inherent in athletics and the undress
that is inherent in drug testing. The Acton Court stresses that by
"choosing to 'go out for the team,' they voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on
'72
students generally.
67. SeeActon, 115 S. Ct. at 2392 (citing NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336

(1985)).
68. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328 (school officials searched student's purse after
student suspected of smoking on school grounds and school officials uncovered
cigarettes and marijuana).
69. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392. There appears, however, that there is far less
allegiance to this so-called locker room mentality today. For example, the following is a colloquy with my 29 year-old wife. Q: "Did you feel comfortable showering
after gym in high school?" A: "Heck no." Q: "Well, the Supreme Court says that
drug testing is OK since students are use to, and at ease with, locker room nudity."
A: "It must have been written by an old man."
70. Id. at 2393.
71. Id. (quoting Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318
(7th Cir. 1988).
72. Id.
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Justice Scalia's touchingly nostalgic view of suiting up, showering and changing clothes recalls the era of nickel cokes and free
lunches; nostalgic sure, but undeniably paternalistic. Apparently if
the NEW YORK TIMES isany indication or if the perceived notion of
many professional sports educators means anything, there is a trend
among American high school students to not accept showering with
classmates after gym or athletics. 73 "In a striking measure of
changed sensibilities in school and society, showering after physical
education class, once an almost military ritual, has become virtually
extinct. And the reasons seem as varied as insecurities about body
image, heightened sexual awareness and a lack of time in a busy
school schedule. ' 74 "Students across the United States have aban73. SeeJohnson, supra note 5, at Al. Johnson noted:

A generation ago, when most schools mandated showers, a teacher would
typically monitor students and handout towels, making sure that proper
hygiene was observed. In schools with pools, students were sometimes
required to swim naked, and teachers would conduct inspections for
cleanliness that schools today would not dare allow, whether because of
greater respect for children or greater fear of lawsuits .... Some people
believe that children today simply grow up accustomed to more privacy.
Years ago, when bigger families lived in smaller houses with fewer bath-

rooms and bedrooms,
modesty.
Id. Johnson also noted
threatened to file a federal
burg, Pennsylvania. See id.

it was the rare child who could maintain a sense of
that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
lawsuit against a mandatory shower policy in HollidaysThe ACLU attorney, David Millstein, represented a shy,

overweight girl who felt humiliated in the showers. See id. The school district ulti-

mately dropped their policy. See id.
74. Id. C.J. Glawe, a 16 year-old sophomore reports that "[y]oujust cake on
the deodorant . ..and hope you're not going to smell too bad." Id. Johnson
further states:
Modesty among young people today seems, in some ways, out of step in a
culture that sells and celebrates the uncovered body in advertisements,
on television and in movies. But some health and physical education experts contend that many students withdraw precisely because of the overload of erotic images - so many perfectly toned bodies cannot help but
leave ordinary mortals feeling a bit inadequate .... Women have long

been bombarded with the images of perfect female bodies. But in recent
years, images of scantily clad muscular men have become much more
widespread .... It also seems that a heightened awareness of sexuality,

including the more open discussions in high schools today about homosexuality, has left many students fretting.
Id. As support, Johnson cites Dr. David Bernhardt, a specialist in pediatrics and
sports medicine at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. See id. Dr. Bernhardt
avers that mandatory showers will not "do any favors for your self-esteem ...[a]nd
when you don't feel good about yourself, you tend to pull back, close off." Id. See
also Melnychenko v. 84 Lumber Co., 676 N.E.2d 45 (Mass. 1997). Melnychenko
seems to hold that intense "locker room" chatter can be actionable in sexual harassment cases, and although not on point, it is a definite pronouncement from a
state Supreme Court that does not diminish the pernicious effect that "locker
room" brutality can have on a person. See id. at 46. And although it calls for more
than occasional locker room chatter that surfaces in the workplace; this opinion
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doned school showers, and their attitudes seem to be much the
same whether they live in inner-city high-rises, on suburban cul-de75
sacs or in far-flung little towns in cornfield country."
After concluding that students have a limited expectation of
privacy that is even further diminished by their choosing to play
sports, Justice Scalia compared the young plaintiff to "adults who
choose to participate in a 'closely regulated industry'." 7 6 Justice
Scalia relied on Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'Ass'n 77 and United
States v. BiswelF8 to buttress his comparison of employment in
79
closely regulated industries and participation in school sports.
The industries in the cases he cites, however, deal with either great
potential danger or the safety of common carrier passengers; both
instances have little or nothing to do with the plight of a would be
seventh-grade football player.
The Acton majority next turned to the character of the intrusion alleged.8 0 The Court recognized that collecting the samples
for urinalysis intruded upon "an excretory function traditionally
shielded by great privacy."8 1 The Court noted, however, that the
demands a pervasive pattern of humiliating, offensive, unwelcome behavior that
creates a hostile work environment. For same-sex sexual harassment, you do have
to go beyond "boys being boys." After Melnychenko, locker room mentality harassment can now be actionable even though the victims are not the typical victims of
sexual harassment, that is, women and gay men.
75. Johnson, supra note 5, at Al. Judy Young, the executive director of the
National Association for Sport and Physical Education, believes it is just a new cultural thing but notes that avoiding showers is not all that new. See id. Even middle
aged people remember having made excuses to avoid showering at school. See id.
76. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
77. 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989).
78. 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
79. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393. The Acton majority makes the jump from the
safety and security sensitive rationale of Skinner and National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). Respondents brief in Acton argued: 'Junior high school athletics is not 'safety' or 'security-sensitive,' as those terms are
used in Skinner and Van Raab. The typical sports injury in Vernonia is a pulled
muscle or torn ligament, and the District has never even had an injury that it can
relate to drugs." Brief for Respondent, Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 115 S.Ct.
2386 (1995) (No. 94-590), 1995 WL 89313, at *17. The question is how and why
did they make this jump? Another question is, did the school district prove drug
infestation generally and more specifically, drug infestation in the athletic program, or did they merely reflect paranoia and rumor-mongering? Teachers
claimed both infestation generally and specifically, and supported their claims, at
least in the minds of the teachers, "by unconfirmed, second-hand reports of offcampus drug use, almost all of it hearsay or hearsay within hearsay." Id. at *3.
Interestingly, the school did not test for alcohol use, which arguably was much
more of a confirmed concern than rumors of drug usage. See id. at *9.
80. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
81. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626
(1989)).
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degree of intrusion depended upon the manner in which the production of the urine sample was monitored. 8 2 Under the policy in
Acton,
male students produce samples at a urinal along a wall.
They remain fully clothed and are only observed from behind, if at all. Female students produce samples in an enclosed stall, with a female monitor standing outside
listening only for sounds of tampering. These conditions
are nearly identical to those typically encountered in public restrooms, which men, women, and especially school
children use daily. Under such conditions, the privacy interests compromised by the process of obtaining the urine
83
sample are in our view negligible.
The so-called diminished expectation reflects a different quantum
of expectation. The comparison to public restrooms is disingenuous, in a restroom you do not have to urinate on command with a
known but non-casual observer watching your every move.
In Acton, the Respondents argued that the Vernonia School
District's policy was in fact more intrusive than at first glance because it required students, "if they are to avoid sanctions for a
falsely positive test, to identify in advance prescription medications
they are taking. 8s4 Justice Scalia once again shielded his analysis by
pointing to Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, wherein the
Court reached the conclusion that requiring the advance disclosure
of medications was not a significant invasion of the right of privacy. 85 A better approach was taken by the California Court of Appeals in Hill v. NCAA. 8 6 In Hill,the court recognized that "the right
to keep one's medical history private is protected" by the California
Constitution.8 7 As the Hill court correctly concluded, "an athlete's
right to privacy should only be abridged when there is a compelling
88
public interest.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 2394.
See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394.

86. 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, 417 (1990), rev'd, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
87. Id. Also, since the right to protective choice is a fundamental right that
falls within the other rights of privacy, the requirement that female athletes declare their use of birth control pills would also invade this right. See id. (citing
Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985)). See also Champion,
NCAA, supra note 7, at 276.
88. Champion, NCAA, supra note 7, at 276.
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The Acton majority next turned to the nature and immediacy
of the governmental concern at issue. Justice Scalia concluded:
[t]hat the nature of the concern is important - indeed,
perhaps compelling - can hardly be doubted. Deterring
drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is at least as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs, which was the
governmental concern in Von Raab, or deterring drug use
by engineers and trainmen, which was the governmental
concern in Skinner. School years are the time when the
physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are
89
most severe.
Certainly, controlling the use of drugs in public schools is extremely important. If it truly is so essential, then why not test everyone? Why not test all seventh-graders? Justice Scalia shouldn't use
sports, as a back door to test seventh-graders, who could not be accessed through the front door.
Justice Scalia concludes with yet another bold, but totally unproved or even unprovable assertion. "Finally, it must not be lost
sight of that this program is directed more narrowly to drug use by
school athletes, where the risk of immediate physical harm to the
drug user or those with whom he is playing his sport is particularly
high."90 Again, this is totally unproved and is not supported by any
credible evidence or documentation. His assertions are based, so it
seems, on misty memories and flimsy hearsay.
C. Justice O'Connor Says "No"
Justice O'Connor opines that exceptions to the probable cause
requirement should only be for exceptional reasons and that
"[b]lanket searches, because they can involve 'thousands or millions' of searches, 'pos[e] a greater threat to liberty' than do suspicion-based ones, which 'affec[t] one person at a time'."9 1 Justice
O'Connor also noted the Court's departure from precedent, stating
that " [f] or most of our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless
searches have been generally considered per se unreasonable within

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we have allowed ex89. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395 (citations omitted).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2397 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.
340, 365 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)) (second and third alterations in
original).
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ceptions in recent years only where it has been clear that a suspicion-based regime would be ineffectual."9' 2 Justice O'Connor, in
good conscience, could not see that a suspicion-based approach
would have proven ineffective under the facts in Acton. Justice
Scalia himself had stated in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab that "[u] ntil today this Court had upheld a bodily search separate from arrest and without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing only with respect to prison inmates, relying upon the uniquely
dangerous nature of that environment." 93 Justice O'Connor was
94
surprised by the apparent contradiction.
Justice O'Connor also demonstrated that she understands the
context of the public school environment and noted that it would
be easy to establish probable cause in the confined, myopic boundaries of the public school classroom. "In most schools, the entire
pool of potential search targets -

students -

is under constant

supervision by teachers and administrators and coaches, be it in
classrooms, hallways, or locker rooms." 9 5 In an environment such
as this, eliciting probable cause would be easy, if it existed. This,
thus, makes searches in the absence of probable cause unacceptably
unreasonable.
Justice O'Connor next attacked the majority's reliance on New
Jersey v. T.L.O. and similar cases. 96 She noted that the cases relied
on by the majority stand for the proposition that schools have substantial leeway in carrying out their traditional mission of responding to students' particular wrongdoings. "By contrast, intrusive,
blanket searches of school children, most of whom are innocent,
for evidence of serious wrongdoing are not part of any traditional
school function of which I am aware. Indeed, many schools, like
many parents, prefer to trust their children unless given reason to
do otherwise.

'9 7

Such was the case of the Acton's father, James

Acton.
Justice O'Connor then gently proceeded to the underlying difference between medical exams and drug tests: the former has no
onus, it is not pejorative, while the drug test contains at least some
punitive elements. "It might also be noted that physical exams (and
of course vaccinations) are not searches for conditions that reflect
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 2398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2401 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2403.
See id.
Id.
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wrongdoing on the part of the student, and so are wholly nonaccusatory and have no consequences that can be regarded as punitive." 9 8 Justice O'Connor rightly believed that drug testing is
different because "the substantial consequences that can flow from
a positive test, such as suspension from sports, are invariably - and
quite reasonably - understood as punishment." 99 Justice
O'Connor therefore concluded that the Acton policy "sweeps too
broadly, and too imprecisely, to be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment."1 00
III.

CONCLUSION

The drug testing of student athletes has been a tempest-in-a-

teapot for at least the last ten years. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County
School Corp. established the parameters for a diminished expectation of privacy, the "locker room mentality" argument. It is a beautifully simplistic argument; and one that defies documentation. It is
a perfect non-argument; something in the same genre as "don't
walk under ladders." The California Court of Appeals in Hill v.
NCAA and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rendition of Acton
both veered towards a more rational way of solving the problem.
However, the California Supreme Court in Hill, and of course, Justice Scalia in Acton, again revisited the Bermuda Triangle of arguments - don't worry about their privacy, they don't expect much
because of THE LOCKER ROOM!!!!!
Justice O'Connor makes a noble attempt at bringing a realitybased approach to this conundrum. The role model and locker
room arguments are inherently weak. She realizes this and understands that this is really an egregious intrusion into the legitimate
privacy rights of an already unprotected group. Analyzing urine is
an intrusive bodily search, and the majority has now accepted suspicionless blanket searches of a closed-set community. Unfortunately, however, Acton's assault on privacy was based on hearsay,
innuendo, gossip and paranoia. The so-called drug revolution is
insufficient, at least in the sub-set of high school athletics, to allow
such an invidious intrusion without a modicum of some legitimate
probable cause.
98. Id.
99. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2405 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2407.
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